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Between Ethics and Aesthetics:
The Residual in Samuel Beckett’s
Minimalism
In his 1936 essay ‘The Storyteller’, Walter Benjamin predicts the
imminent death of the era of storytelling, a decline which he
attributes to a decrease in the communicability of experience.
Yet the bleak tone of his essay is tempered by the deliberately
suggestive assertion that the removal of narrative from the realm
of living speech ‘is making it possible to see a new beauty in what
is vanishing’ (Benjamin, 1936, 87).
Nothing haunts Samuel Beckett’s art more than the simultaneous
impossibility and necessity of telling a story, of communicating,
of sharing experience. It is this aporia which, in the 1960s,
leads Beckett to an altogether different art form in his prose
writing, a ‘new beauty’ which is inextricable from the feeling of
incommunicability: the minimalist aesthetic.
Focusing on his collection Têtes-mortes, ‘Sans’ (1969) – ‘D’un
ouvrage abandonné’ – ‘Assez’ – ‘Imagination morte imaginez’ –
‘Bing’ (1972), I wish to explore Beckett’s relation to the artistic
trend of minimalism. In these minima, he turns away from the
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obsessive accumulation of stories that constitutes the locus of the
trilogy (Molloy–Malone meurt–L’Innommable) towards a different
approach, which relies on the paring down of the writer’s means
of expression, the written word. As indicated by the French and
English titles of the collection, Têtes-mortes and Residua, it is the
view of the work as an inherent remainder that makes Beckett’s
minimalist aesthetics an ethical affirmation of the irreducible
residue. His works communicate precisely in their refusal of
communication, denotation and meaning: through their inherent
excess. Because their lack of communication is also an excess
over communication, they are conditioned by the paradox of
minimalism, encapsulated by Ludwig Mies van der Rohe’s famous
motto: ‘less is more’.
A movement mainly associated with 1960s American visual
art, whose leading representatives reduced their canvases to solid
swaths of monochromatic colours or their sculptures to uninflected
geometrical shapes, minimalism has been described succinctly by
Edward Strickland as an art form ‘that makes its statement with
limited, if not the fewest possible, resources’ (Strickland, 2000, 7).
Guided by the asymptotic movement toward an irreducible object,
minimalism has been seen as an art of rejection (Lucy Lippard),
reduction (Clement Greenberg and Michael Fried), and exclusion
(Carl Andre). The movement has also engendered more derisory
terms, like ‘anti-art’, ‘new nihilism’ and ‘low-boredom art’, coined
by the artist and New York Times critic Brian O’Doherty (Strickland,
2000, 17). Even the minimalist masters themselves questioned one
another’s premises. For instance, Donald Judd was ambivalent
about Robert Morris’s works in his review of the show ‘Black,
White, and Gray’: ‘they are next to nothing; you wondered why
anyone would build something only barely present’ (Judd, 1964,
117). Morris’s work aroused suspicion because of its liminal
position on the brink of nonentity and non-art. Judd continues:
‘Morris’s pieces exist after all, as meager as they are [. . .] but these
facts of existence are as simple as they are obdurate – as are Morris’s
objects’ (1964, 117). Yet this very liminality, this quasi-absence
arguably constitutes a positive affirmation. Only by hovering on
the brink of nothingness, by removing so much, can minimalism
capitalise on what is obdurate and obstinate because it is a tiny,
ungraspable remainder.
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This affirmation of the residue is overt in some practical
manifestations of minimalism: in Morris’s Box for Standing (1961),
a coffin-like structure, and in the reclamation of ruins for his
famous Land Art piece in Ijmuiden, the Netherlands, entitled
Observatory (1971); in Anne Truitt’s Southern Elegy (1961–2),
which suggests a tombstone; in Carl Andre’s Dogturds (1962),
controversial depictions of animal excrement; in Dick Bellamy’s
display of Lucas Samaras’s squalid bedroom contents at the Green
Gallery (1964) (Meyer, 2001, 45); in Robert Smithson’s earthwork
sculpture, Spiral Jetty (1970), which affirms the entropic movement
toward nothingness that he theorises in his essay ‘Entropy and
the New Monuments’. The celebration of ruins, excrement, death,
trash and decay constitutes an affirmation of the residue that resists
decay insofar as it is decay.
It is not just the practice of minimalism in the sixties and early
seventies, however, that reveals an inextricable relationship with
the irreducible residue, but also the theoretical discourse that
surrounds it. As James Meyer points out in his brilliant account of
the polemics surrounding minimalism, it is because it is defined
and conditioned by semiological refusal that it has engendered
such a lively, unending critical reception:
The minimalist refusal of subject matter only provoked
successive writers to interpret an art whose aim was to short-
circuit and indeed defy the act of interpretation itself. (Meyer,
2001, 150)
A paradox thus inhabits minimalism: the evacuation of content
simultaneously incites and thwarts critical reflection. Because at its
heart lies an excess that thwarts explanation, critics have striven
to theorise it – whether to explain, justify or condemn. I will
situate my argument in relation to some of these discourses, but
in the paradoxical attempt to theorise that which always-already
lies beyond interpretation, beyond meaning, beyond theory: the
residue.
Though Beckett’s own writings on art focus on the movement
that precedes minimalism, namely Abstract Expressionism (Three
Dialogues), his work constitutes a dynamic dialogue with this
aesthetics of exclusion. This is most evident in his direction of
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his own plays, encapsulated in the fervently repeated instruction
to Donald McWhinnie of Mies’s motto (Knowlson, 2006/7, 26).
Regarding his play That Time, for instance, he noted: ‘to the
objection visual component too small, out of all proportion with
aural, answer: make it smaller on the principle that less is more’
(Knowlson, 1979, 219). Furthermore, his minimalist works had
a huge impact on his artistic contemporaries and descendants.
Rosalind Krauss notes Beckett’s ‘veneration’ by the 1960s
minimalist visual artists (Krauss, 1985, 258). Morris, in particular,
has acknowledged Beckett’s influence in an interview with Jack
Burnham recorded on November 21, 1975 (Berger, 1989, 45). Much
musical minimalism is based on or inspired by Beckettian texts.
Both Philip Glass and Morton Feldman collaborated with Beckett:
Feldman, who first met Beckett during a rehearsal of Waiting for
Godot in the 1970s, wrote the music for Beckett’s Music and Words
(1962) and the opera Neither (1977); Glass composed the music for
Play (1965), a piece which, according to Robert Schwarz, constitutes
‘the first evidence of his newly reductive, rhythmically repetitive
idiom’ (Schwarz, 1996, 116). However, the empirical evidence of
direct influence – admittedly difficult to pin down given the varied
manifestations of the trend – is in this context of less interest than
the extent to which Beckett’s works follow, articulate and affirm the
broader logic of minimalism.
Too much and too little has been said of Beckett’s relation
to this widespread artistic trend. Some authors make passing
reference to his minimalism. Debra Malina, in Breaking the
Frame, associates it with the nihilistic aspect of his work, the
relentless progression of his texts toward nothingness: ‘paring
away layer after layer of narrative trappings, Beckett heads toward
a minimalism so much “less”, so much “worse”, that it cannot
sustain its productions’ (Malina, 2002, 28). Others use minimalism
as a means of classification, in order to situate him in relation
to broader trends. In Beckett’s Literary Legacies, Friedhelm Rathjen
refers to his ‘literary minimalism’ that influenced Jürg Laederach
and Catherine Morley to his ‘abstract minimalism’ whose traces are
found in Paul Auster’s New York Trilogy (Feldman, 2007, 129, 189).
Though these readings are useful, I want to look deeper into the
particular connections between Beckett’s ethics and the aesthetics
of minimalism.
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A number of critics look at Beckett’s work in relation to
single artists who have been classified as minimalists. Rosalind
Krauss in her essay on Sol LeWitt uses quotations from Molloy
to illustrate LeWitt’s Absurd Nominalism (Krauss, 1985, 244–258).
Guy Debrock explores the relationship between Beckett and the
minimalist composer Morton Feldman through G. H. Mead’s
theory that language is a form of gesture. In the following study,
Beckett’s Têtes-mortes will be examined in the context of a more
open and dynamic artistic field, encompassing the visual arts
(Robert Morris, Donald Judd, Richard Tuttle, Anne Truitt and
Robert Smithson) and music (Philip Glass, Steve Reich and Morton
Feldman), in the attempt not to homogenise this varied group
of artists, but rather in order to explore the very residuality that
renders them resistant to homogenisation.
This approach differs from previous readings, which have often
regarded Beckett’s works as miniatures that are complete, whole,
and perfect. Though Enoch Brater, in his article ‘Why Beckett’s
“Enough” is More or Less Enough’, starts off by referring to the
text ‘Assez’ as an example of his ‘minimalist prose’, or his ‘residual
prose’, he then equates this with something that is subtly, but
crucially, very different: he calls the text a ‘miniature’ version, a
‘possible abstract’ of the longer Mercier et Camier, on the basis
that, ‘within the dimensions of its own small boundaries, Enough
is [. . .] a whole’ (Brater, 1980, 252, 260, 264). Similarly, Vivian
Mercier insists that ‘the brevity of the latter works is not due to
any philosophical aspiration toward silence but to perfectionism
[. . .] The only perfectly finished piece of workmanship is the
miniature’ (Mercier, 1977, 237). Here, the miniature is confused
with the minimal, the manifestation of a very different desire:
whereas miniaturism aims to produce a tiny version of an original
image without any deletions, minimalism’s object is to produce
a partial version of an absent whole (Hallett, 1999, 9). As we
shall see, it is the second, minimalist logic that governs Beckett’s
texts, whose ‘philosophical aspiration towards silence’ is endlessly
thwarted, inherently impossible, and thus doomed to incompletion
and imperfection.
In the same vein as Brater and Mercier, S. E. Gontarski regards
his short pieces as the ‘distillation of essences’ (Gontarski, 1995, xi).
This echoes E. C. Goossen’s view of minimalism in the visual
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arts: writing on his exhibition called ‘Distillation’ (1966), he calls it
an ‘intentional distillation’ and consequent ‘essentialization’; ‘each
[young artist] is submitting his vision to the alembic in order to
reduce it to its best essence’ (Battcock, 1995, 172–3). Against this,
however, I will argue that the minimal artwork’s affirmation of the
residue makes it resistant to any such essentialising tendencies. An
excellent point of departure is Herbert Blau’s ‘ “The Commodius
Vicus” of Beckett’, in which Blau links Beckett’s entropic vision
not only to the ruins of history in and of modernity, but also
to the human condition: both are characterised by an endless
process of mourning, a process that is endless because of the
‘immitigable impasse of the human itself, which can neither
be painted, sculpted, installed, caught on a videodisc, nor [. . .]
somehow performed away’ (Gontarski and Uhlmann, 2006, 37).
This impasse – caused by the resistant residue that will never
yield – is that which leads Blau to connect Beckett with the
minimalist movement of the 1960s. Yet the connection is qualified
by Blau:
What may have been missing, however, in the conceptual
substance of the artists referred to by Smithson in “Entropy
and the New Monuments” (Flavin, Judd, Lichtenstein, LeWitt,
Thek) was [. . .] the residual metaphysics in the diminuendo
of being, the mourning in the entropic, so endemic to Beckett.
(Gontarski and Uhlmann, 2006, 29)
By relating Beckett’s short fiction from the late 1960s and early
1970s to parallel trends in art and music, I will argue that, whether
consciously or not, the aesthetico-philosophical inclination toward
lessness – what Blau terms the ‘residual metaphysics in the
diminuendo of being’ – permeates minimalism.
In order to explore the convergence between Beckett’s aesthetics
of minimalism and his ethics of residuality, I will place his minima
within the context of the ethical thought of Theodor Adorno, Alain
Badiou and Jacques Derrida. As we shall see, it is the affirmation
of the residue that links the notion of subtraction posited by
Adorno in his analysis of Endgame to Derrida’s ‘presque rien’
and Badiou’s ‘différence minuscule’ between ‘fond’ and ‘forme’,
‘lieu et avoir lieu’ (Badiou, 2005, 86). These different theories
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of the vanishing remainder, the Beckettian deadhead that resists
annihilation, express a common skepticism toward self-identity
and a consequent belief that any object (whether in art or life)
is always in excess over itself. In turn, this will be related to
Derrida’s notion of ‘différance’, a term that constitutes a play
on the words difference and deferral, and affirms the perpetual
postponement of fixed meaning due to the absent-presence of an
unnameable, minimal excess. These diverse philosophies will be
brought together through a common strand: the writing of the
residue, or the residue of writing.
Adorno’s influential essay ‘Trying to Understand Endgame’ is
a good place from which to explore the correlation between
Beckett’s minimalism and the content of his work, or rather its
lack of content, its evacuation of the traditional categories of
subject, identity and meaning. As Adorno insists, existentialist
subjectivity constitutes the negation of the particularity and
contingency of existence, an ‘unacknowledged abstraction, [to]
which Beckett poses the decisive antithesis: an avowed process
of subtraction’ (Adorno, 1991, 246). However, the move away
from the universal qualities of existentialist ontology – and the
consequent subtraction of the subject from existence – requires the
emptying out of subjective substance, which in itself constitutes a
movement towards extreme abstraction. This evacuation of content
grounds Beckett’s minimalism: ‘the strict ration of reality and
characters which the drama is allotted and with which it makes
do, is identical to what remains of the subject, spirit, soul in view
of the permanent catastrophe’ (Adorno, 1991, 251), in view of the
simultaneous impossibility and necessity of surviving after the
Holocaust.
Yet Beckett’s writing is not governed by a negative focus
on ‘what remains’, but by an assertion of the remainder. The
title, Têtes-mortes, is a translation of the Latin ‘caput mortuum’,
which designates the worthless, irreducible chemical deposit
left behind after the process of distillation. At the centre of
the collection, then, lies a minimal remainder that blocks the
processes of abstraction, universalisation and purification, whose
most extreme manifestation was the Holocaust itself. In Derrida’s
terms, what remains after the Shoah is the undecidable remainder
of holocaustal fire, ‘la restance du reste – la cendre, presque rien’
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(Derrida, 1986, 77). What is at stake here is not simply absence,
but the presence of absence, not loss, but the reminder of that
which had taken place, not the ‘rien’, but the ‘presque rien’. Beckett’s
abstraction is grounded in the capitalisation of this residue. For
Badiou, this residue is the ‘minimal difference’ that is glimpsed
through a dual process of purification (which takes the form of
abstraction in art) and subtraction:
Épuiser la réalité, non pour l’anéantir dans sa surface, mais
en la soustrayant à son unité apparente pour y détecter
la différence minuscule, le terme évanouissant qui en est
constitutif. (Badiou, 2005, 98)
The formal constraints placed on Têtes-mortes thereby constitute an
aesthetic response to an ethical problem: minimalism is a means of
formalisation at the point where there is almost nothing, at the edge
of the void. As Meyer points out, ‘in refusing to point directly to
the world, the minimalist work sublates, and obliquely alludes to,
the reality it negates’ (Meyer, 2001, 187). The vanishing remainder
can only be sublated, or subtracted, through refusal, rejection
and exclusion. Reacting against Lukács’s denunciation of Beckett’s
decadent formalism, Adorno expresses the subtractive imperative
thus: ‘in all art that is still possible, social critique must be raised to
the level of form, to the point that it wipes out all manifestly social
content’ (Adorno, 2004, 325). Minimalism, defined by this very
wiping out of content, allows Beckett to formalise the formless,
to locate social critique in the minimal, material residue. Hence
the duality of minimalism is captured by Adorno’s description of
Beckett’s aesthetic formalism: the simultaneous focus on the ‘paltry
materials’ by which subjectivity is expressed and their dissolution,
their reduction to ‘geometric forms’ (Adorno, 1991, 250–1).
The position of Beckett’s prose on the brink of artistic nonentity
is such that all the traditional components of the literary
text – character/subject, plot, setting, symbolism/meaning – are
stripped down to a minimum. This reduction is emphasised
by the imperative mode adopted by the self-reflexive voice of
‘Imagination morte imaginez’: ‘Iles, eaux, azur, verdure, fixez, pff,
muscade, une éternité, taisez’ (Beckett, 1967, 51).1 Deprived of all
remnants of a familiar earth, the setting is reduced to a geometrical
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shape, ‘une rotonde sans ornement’ (51). This reference, whether
conscious or unconscious, to Adolf Loos’ famous aphorism
‘ornament is crime’ (Gontarski, 1995, XV), undoubtedly connects
Beckett’s texts with the minimalist trend.
Many critics have regarded this rotunda as a skull. Yet this
restrictive interpretation misses the point of the minimalistic
exclusion of recognisable features: the thwarting of any possible
symbolism; the negation of meaning itself. The same can be said
of Têtes-mortes as of Endgame: it ‘mocks the [reader] with the
suggestion of something symbolic, something which, like Kafka,
it then withholds’ (Adorno, 1991, 251). This is made apparent
in the three so-called events in ‘D’un ouvrage abandonné’, the
vanishing apparitions of the white horse, the stoats and the
roadman Balfe. Whilst Beckett tempts us with possible symbolism,
he simultaneously deprives us of any such transcendence. As
Michael Fried says with reference to Judd in his influential critique
of minimalism, ‘the materials do not represent, signify, or allude to
anything; they are what they are and nothing more’ (Fried, 1967,
165). Indeed, as suggested by the ‘signes sans sens’ that litter ‘Bing’
(61–2), the inner sphere to which the extensional world seems to
point in Beckett’s Têtes-mortes no longer exists, leaving the events
to hang like empty balloons.
Just like the settings, the characters of Têtes-mortes are pared
down to mere geometrical shapes, to form rather than substance.
In ‘Imagination’, each body is ‘inscrit dans le demi-cercle ACB’, its
extremities treated as geometrical points (55). The body is stripped
down to a ‘petit bloc’ in ‘Sans’ (Beckett, 1969, 9),2 or a ‘corps nu
blanc fixe un mètre’, ‘talons joints angle droit’ in ‘Bing’ (61). The
same geometrical figures characterise the works by the minimalist
masters Tuttle and Morris, whose octagons and weighty blocks,
respectively, give form to emptiness and thus affirm the medium.
As Morris himself asserts, ‘blank form is like life, essentially empty’
(Meyer, 2001, 153). This emptiness, however, is not nothing: it is
something. As Judd says of Morris’s works displayed at the Black,
White, and Gray exhibition (1964), the ‘pieces exist after all, as
meager as they are’ (117). The same can be said of the extreme
formal abstraction in Beckett’s ‘Imagination’: the ‘petit bloc’ of
the body gives shape to the negation of content; the frames of
the shapes (the lines from A to B to C) have a performative
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function, making the indistinguishable distinct, giving substance
to the insubstantial. Like the oft-misinterpreted Textes pour rien,
which are ‘for nothing’ not only in a negative sense, in their futility,
but also in an affirmative sense, in their asymptotic movement
toward nothingness, Beckett’s Têtes-mortes affirm the residue in
their infinite decay.
Indeed, purification is always followed and counterbalanced
by subtraction in the Têtes-mortes. At first, it appears that the
process of evacuation has left the reader with nothing: ‘nulle part
trace de vie’ (‘Imagination’, 51); ‘tout su tout blanc’ (‘Bing’, 61);
‘tout ce qui précède oublier’ (‘Assez’, 33). Through these absolute
statements, Beckett gives the deceptive impression of a purified,
totalised status quo. Yet this impression, in all cases, is immediately
negated, as ‘mille petits signes trop longs à imaginer’ emerge in
‘Imagination’ (17), as traces and figures appear against the white
background in ‘Bing’, and as memories come flooding back in
‘Assez’. Yet these traces are always on the brink of disappearance,
of nothingness. The murmur in ‘Bing’ is qualified almost out of
existence: ‘murmure à peine presque jamais une seconde temps
sidéral ça de mémoire’ (63). In ‘Sans’, everything is reduced to fine
sand, tiny remnants of disseminated entities: ‘terre sable même gris
que l’air le ciel le corps les ruines sable fin gris cendre’ (16). The
sand, ash-grey, is the Derridean ‘presque rien’ par excellence, the ash
of holocaustal fire.
Frederick Barthelme’s defence of minimalist literature, his
assertion that it enables the reader to ‘hear the whispers,
catch the feints and shadows, gather the traces’ (Barthelme,
2009), should therefore be qualified: Beckett’s traces are not,
and cannot, be heard, caught or gathered as such; they are
the Derridean ‘presque rien’, the miniscule residue that can
never be grasped; the Badiouian ‘terme évanouissant’ that resists
incorporation. His Têtes-mortes affirm what Badiou calls the
minimal difference between ground and form, place and taking
place (cited above). In ‘Imagination’, white semi-circles, bodies and
limbs appear against the white backdrop; in ‘Bing’, we glimpse
the ‘traces fouillis gris pâle presque blanc sur blanc’ (61); in
‘Sans’, the earth/sky/body/ruins are simultaneously blended and
differentiated through grey tones: ‘même gris partout terre ciel
corps ruines’ (8). The merging of white/grey form and white/grey
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ground is the literary echo of Malevich’s White on white (1918),
in which subtle hues are used to allude to an absent-present
geometrical form and thus to highlight the Badiouian minimal
difference.
The condition of this minimal differentiation is suggested in
‘Imagination’ by Beckett’s descriptions of the rotunda’s whiteness,
‘se fondant dans l’environnante’, and of the body, ‘se confondant
avec le sol’ (55). As an ever-unfinished process of paring down,
emphasised here by the continuous present tense, the minimal
artwork only ever verges on nonentity, the figure is never
completely indistinguishable from the background. Purgation is
therefore a never-ending, and therefore necessarily incomplete,
process. Mies’s ‘less is more’ motto thus acquires ethical weight:
only by paring the artwork down to a state of deficiency can
there be a manifestation of the unnameable excess. In this light,
the narrator’s acknowledgement that the barely visible body is
‘finalement de femme’ (55), recognisable in spite of everything,
gains particular relevance: only the presentation of the distinct
within the indistinct can affirm the minimal difference.
Importantly, though, the Beckettian ‘forme’ is only ever barely
distinguishable from the ‘fond’. This is made explicit by the flowers
in ‘Assez’, which are revealed to be literally ungatherable:
Il faut dire qu’il n’y avait rien à emporter. Les fleurs elles-
mêmes étaient sans tige et plaquées au sol à la manière des
nenuphars. Plus question qu’elles brillent à la boutonnière.
(45)
Lacking stems, the flowers are located on the boundary between
‘fond’ (the ground) and ‘forme’ (the flower). The fact that there
is nothing to be swept away shows the flowers to be stubborn
survivors of the storm’s attempt to wipe the space clean. This is
surely due to the status of the flowers as scraps of the narrator’s
past life: they are no longer real flowers, but figments of the
imagination; they are two-dimensional because they have become
mere images in the narrator’s memory; images that cannot be
framed or captured.
The final sentence thus gains ethical significance: the stemless
quality of the flowers, their inability to decorate the buttonhole, is
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due to their residual status; their loss of use-value renders them
ungatherable and thus invulnerable; like the old man’s ‘ruines
sacrées’ (41), which are sacred, untouchable and immortal only
because they are ruins, the flowers are ungraspable. Beckett thus
overturns the Romantic image of the flower as the affirmation
of finitude, death and decay. As an image qua image, the flower
becomes irreducible, located as it is within the timeless space of
the imagination. In this vein, the ending of ‘Assez’ can be read
as one of affirmation rather than despairing negation: ‘Je m’en
vais maintenant tout effacer sauf les fleurs. Plus de pluies. Plus de
mamelons. Rien que nous deux nous traînant dans les fleurs’ (47).
This capitalises on the Badiouian notion, quoted above, that reality
is purified not to achieve, but rather to block, its annihilation,
to isolate the ‘vanishing term which constitutes it’. The flowers
constitute precisely such a ‘vanishing term’, the fragile figments
in the narrator’s fragile memory of a fragile relationship with a
fragile man. Their disappearance causes constant reappearances: as
figments, they constitute the lovers’ reality, their only ‘sustentation’
(47), their means of survival.
Beckett can in this context be compared with Truitt, whose
two-dimensional works affirm the residuality of remembered
experience. Her works conjure up the seventeenth and eighteenth-
century architecture of her childhood town of Easton in Maryland:
First and Southern Elegy (1961–62), for example, are reminiscent of
a picket fence and a tombstone, respectively; her drawings from
that period conjure up portals, columns, trellises and colonnades
(Meyer, 2001, 68). As Meyer notes, ‘they are not the direct result
of an empirical perception (“I am drawing a building”) but forms
recalled from her memory’, abstracted and sublated renditions
of diverse architectural forms (Meyer, 2001, 68). Like Beckett’s
flowers, these fragments or figments are not representative but
suggestive; they are flattened out and emptied of function; they
are the remnants of memories, which are themselves residues
of experience. And it is paradoxically their status as vanishing
remainders that renders them irreducible and invulnerable. Her
minimalism, in this sense, serves not to reduce, but on the contrary
to block reduction.
As Fried points out in ‘Art and Objecthood’, the minimal
artwork – the material as material – resists incorporation and
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annihilation through its materiality, its objecthood. Because the
material always remains as nothing but the material, the experience
of the minimal object is ‘one of endlessness and inexhaustibility, of
being able to go on and on’ (Fried, 1967, 165). Central to the concept
of minimalism, then, is the Beckettian finitude without end, the
infinitude which is at once an impossibility and an imperative. As
Morris affirms, the viewer is tied to the object and freed from it
forever:
Once it has been established it does not disintegrate. One is
then both free of the shape and bound to it. Free or released
because of the exhaustion of information about it, as shape,
and bound to it because it remains constant and indivisible.
(Morris, 1966, 228)
In the same vein, Beckett’s reader is simultaneously free (because
the texts refuse to represent or symbolise) and bound (condemned
to an infinite process of reading the indivisible, indissoluble,
irreducible residue). Because there is almost nothing to exhaust, the
object is inexhaustible.
Yet it is not through wholeness, but rather through perpetual
fragmentation, that Beckett’s minimalism thwarts annihilation.
This is made clear in ‘Imagination’, where any wholeness is denied
through occlusion. The narrative voice, with the dry tone of a
property surveyor, observes that ‘les corps paraissent entiers [. . .]
à en juger d’après les parties offertes à la vue’ (56–7; my emphasis).
The serious assertion of their wholeness is undermined by the
ironic qualification (emphasised), and the consequent parody of
any figural representation, which can only ever be metonymic.
Because of the flickering light, the observer’s vision is blinkered
and the ‘inspection est malaisée’ (56). This emphasises the futility
of any human aspiration to wholeness: just like the body parts
concealed from the gaze, there is always-already an excess, a
residue that escapes human knowledge. This fragmentation of
vision can be likened to the minimalism of Carl Andre, whose
styrofoam works Crib, Coin and Compound (1965) filled the room
and therefore obstructed vision. As Lippard observed, ‘no attempt
was made to make [the works] . . . visible at all. There was only
room for the determined viewer to edge around the forms, and
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vantage points were denied’ (Meyer, 2001, 132). The exhibition,
like the bodies in ‘Imagination’, thus thwarted any unification,
wholeness or totalisation.
Meyer is right to question, on this basis, the equation of
minimalism with literalism by critics like Fried and artists like
Stella – encapsulated by his famous tautology, ‘what you see is
what you see’ (Battcock, 1995, 158):
Decisively suggested by Judd and Fried, the premise that
minimalist work makes itself visible in its entirety masks
the ambiguities of that experience and, what is more, the
distinctive ways in which these practices are seen. Literalism
is a good starting point, but it is no longer an adequate model
for describing how we actually experience the art. Would
minimalism continue to attract viewers decades later if the
works were as transparent to vision as we are told? (7–8)
The ambiguity, indeterminacy and inscrutability of minimal
art thus prevent any self-identity, which in turn prevents
wholeness and completion. In this sense, it is as ever-incomplete,
minimal fragments – rather than whole, miniature objects – that the
Beckettian Têtes-mortes continue to end again and again, at once
depriving and nourishing the reader ad infinitum.
This logic is rendered beautifully by Derrida’s famous pun,
‘différance’, the idea that meaning is always deferred and differed
due to the absent-presence of an unnameable, minimal excess.
While deferral entails deprivation, difference means perpetual
nourishment. Because the Têtes-mortes affirm the absent-present
remainder, they are renewed through every new context and any
meaning is perpetually delayed. This is reflected within the texts
themselves. It is due to the transformative power of context, for
example, that the melancholic retracing of old steps through old
fields in ‘Assez’ is a journey of perpetual renewal: ‘Je vois les
fleurs à mes pieds et ce sont les autres que je vois’ (39). The
flowers refuse self-identity: homogeneity produces heterogeneity;
the same is subject to flux. In this vein, I would like to propose an
alternative reading of ‘Assez’ to that offered by Brater in his article
‘Why Beckett’s “Enough” is More or Less Enough’. While Brater
argues that ‘Enough’ is indeed enough on the basis that the text
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is a complete, self-contained miniature, I would suggest that it is
because the text is the minimal remainder of an absent whole, and
therefore inherently incomplete, that – in Brater’s own words – ‘no
two encounters with this text can ever be exactly alike’ (Brater,
1980, 265).
Because of the logic of ‘différance’ that underpins minimalism,
the sameness, monotony and repetition that characterise the
minimal artwork is paradoxically an affirmation of difference,
renewal and change. In ‘Bing’, for example, the same repeated
words (like ‘blanc’, ‘gris’, ‘murmures’) create a mesmerising effect,
which is punctured by the impingement of the ‘bing’ and ‘hop’
sounds, and by single, outstanding words, such as ‘cicatrices’
and ‘chairs blessées’ (64). The text thus invites comparison with
the music of Beckett’s contemporaries, Feldman and Reich, for
whom repetition is a vehicle for development and change. This
connection is underlined by Feldman’s lengthy, monotonous piece
that the composer dedicated to Beckett: For Beckett (1986). As Guy
Debrock puts it, ‘the sound is always the same, yet never quite the
same’ (Debrock, 1991, 71); maximal sameness highlights minimal
difference. Similarly, the maximal sameness of Reich’s Pendulum
music (1968), achieved through constant, hallucinatory repetition of
identical melodies and rhythms, serves to highlight non-identity,
and to accentuate the minimal differences in the music: the tiny,
barely audible changes in length, colour, rhythm and intensity. The
rigid corset of the music has the same effect as the tight gloves
worn by the lovers in ‘Assez’: ‘loin d’amortir les formes ils les
accusaient en les simplifiant’ (36). The evacuation of difference
through repetition thus allows the accentuation of the minimal,
residual difference.
While Art Lange’s description of Feldman’s For Beckett as a
‘Beckett-like punishment’ rings true in this context, the following
conclusion might be qualified: ‘it could be one of Beckett’s static
dramas; since continuity, unasked for, is inevitable, there’s no need
to invent anything. Everything simply is, and continues to be’
(Debrock, 1991, 71–2). On the contrary, it is arguably only through
perpetual re-invention that the artwork continues to be; only
through constant recontextualisation that the ending is deferred.
This is suggested obliquely by Feldman himself. Regarding his
music for the opera Neither written by Beckett, he says that ‘it is
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not directional. Time makes the line, the connection. Time itself
becomes what is lyrical’ (Debrock, 1991, 72). This is because time
entails the perpetual change of context, and therefore difference
and deferral; the experience of hearing the music in time produces
the line, the connection, the artwork itself.
By implication, the temporal experience of the listener or reader
is the condition of the minimal work of art. This is clearest in
‘Bing’, where the central concern of the work is not its substance
or content, but rather its performance, its rhythm and tone, pulse
and accentuation. The prose text becomes a piece of music, or more
simply a collection of noises, to be perpetually written and re-
written, combined and re-combined.3 This focus on the materiality
of language – on words as sounds rather than signifiers – is again
characteristic of Feldman’s music. As Debrock puts it in his essay
on Beckett and Feldman, the composer exploits notes just as the
writer uses words, in all their non-communicative materiality:
‘the music is not telling a story, nor is it expressing sentiment.
It is a gesture, begging us, commanding us to react in some
way’ (Debrock, 1991, 80). The residue that is always beyond
communication, meaning, and fixity is therefore the excess of
performance, of walking through the same fields time and again,
of telling the story anew.
In ‘Imagination’, the performative element is emphasised self-
referentially, as the reader is interpellated through quasi-stage
directions: ‘faites seulement ah à peine, dans ce silence, et dans
l’instant même pour l’œil de proie l’infime tressaillement aussitôt
réprimé’ (57). Here, the ambiguity of the ‘infime tressaillement’,
the almost imperceptible excess, derives from the blurring of the
categories of subject and object, reader and character. The reader
is forced not only to perceive the minimal difference, but also to
perform or effect it through minimal intrusion, and therefore to
become a residue, the affective excess that cannot be incorporated
by language. By virtually dissolving the reader into the text, by
creating the illusion of a shared physical sensation, a shudder,
Beckett’s ‘Imagination’ ruptures Benjamin’s incommunicability,
communicating (through) the residue.
This immediate, physical connection between the artwork and
its viewer or listener is characteristic of minimal art and music.
In an interview with Nicholas Zurbrugg, Philip Glass asserts that
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the main artistic inspiration he drew from Beckett’s work was its
active relationship with its audience: ‘when an audience looks at
Beckett’s work, the work is no longer an independent thing. It’s the
relationship between the work and the audience that we’re talking
about’ (Oppenheim, 1999, 147). In the visual arts, it is Morris’s
sculptures that best encapsulate this blurring of the artwork with
the viewer’s experience. For his Tate labyrinth installation aptly
entitled Bodymotionspacethings (1971), Morris invited visitors to
climb, crawl on, balance in, and touch the object, thus subverting
any distanced, reverential relation to the museum institution.
Emphasis was placed on the physical, the visceral, and the sensual.
As Morris said himself,
Deeply skeptical of experiences beyond the reach of the body,
the more formal aspect of the work in question provides a
place in which the perceiving self might take measure of
certain aspects of its own physical existence. (Berger, 1989, 147)
This celebration of the bodily is also an affirmation of what Morris
himself called the ‘unfixed variables’, the contextual factors like
light, space and physical vantage-point that affect the experience
of the work of art (Morris, 1966, 234) – factors that produce
Derridean ‘différance’. Presentness, then, or even experience itself,
is thus the irreducible element that allows the artwork to be
reconfigured through every new viewing. Morris’s sculptures, like
Beckett’s texts and Feldman’s music, affirm the necessary residue
that always-already exceeds the artwork: present experience, the
experience of the immediate present, and thus experience of/in
time, the body in time, the time of the body. The key, then, lies not
in what the work of art means, says or communicates, but rather in
what it does.
The ending of Beckett’s ‘Imagination’ thus gains significance:
‘Laissez-les là, en sueur et glacés, il y a mieux ailleurs. Mais non,
[. . .] il n’y a rien ailleurs’ (57). There is nothing but the frozen,
sweating body, the material manifestation of the endless storm.
Like the steam left on the mirror by the seemingly lifeless bodies
in ‘Imagination’ (56), or the scar highlighted within the neutrality
of ‘Bing’ (64), the excess of the human body is the affirmation of the
minimal difference within maximal sameness, of the residue that
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resists incorporation. Scraps of tortured bodies are finally the only
possible remainder of an ineffable disaster, what Adorno terms the
‘permanent catastrophe’.
It is therefore not just the subject – reader/writer/character – that
is reduced, as Adorno rightly observes, to a ‘ “here and
now”, a “whatchamacallit” ’ (Adorno, 1991, 246). It is also
the experience of the artwork, the aesthetic affect. Indeed, the
material constraints placed on Beckett’s Têtes-mortes lead to the
emergence of the sensory from the conceptual, the momentary
from the accumulative. The texts’ constant repetition highlights
the difference of the same and therefore the single, present instant,
whether the instantaneously repressed flinch in ‘Imagination’, the
intermittent interferences in ‘Bing’, the fleeting visions of the horse,
stoats and roadman in ‘D’un ouvrage abandonné’, or the single
step, ‘encore un pas un seul’, in ‘Sans’ (12). The resistance of the
instantaneous to annihilation is twofold. As a mere sensation, a
‘vanishing term’ par excellence, it defies totalising knowledge and
thus cannot be captured, gathered or appropriated. Always new,
always ‘encore un’, it is infinite in its very finitude, endless because
it has always-already ended.
In Beyond Minimalism, Brater attempts to release Beckett’s later
plays from pejorative associations with the 1960s art form. He
argues that Beckett’s late plays are ‘beyond minimalism’ because
they tend toward ‘something far more concrete: what remains in
the theatre, live and palpable and real, after so much has been taken
away’ (Brater, 1987, ix). Yet as we have seen, at the very centre of the
minimalist movement lies a desire to pare down the object in order
to reduce it to physical presence. Moreover, Beckett’s minimalism is
not just an incidental aspect of his work, but rather the constitutive
condition of his ethical stance. It is only by paring the artwork
down to the minimal remainder that he is able to subtract the
particular, the singular, the ‘presque rien’ – the irreducible material
excess that always-already prevents self-identity.
In trying to take Beckett beyond minimalism, Brater unwittingly
reaffirms the achievement of the movement: ‘Beckett’s plays
demonstrate an aesthetic which goes far beyond the limited and
often de-humanised sphere we recognise in the chilling reticence
of minimalist art’ (Brater, 1987, ix). Yet as it has been argued,
minimalism is characterised by its excess over itself: its limitations
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are its potential, because the effect of the work necessarily lies
beyond its content, because the artwork refuses self-identity.
Minimalism, then, is intrinsically ‘beyond minimalism’.
Only recently has Beckett criticism shifted from a negative focus
on Beckett’s negation of language, meaning, communicability to a
rather more positive view of his works’ affirmation of the body,
of presence and of performance.4 This theoretical shift arguably
coincides with a necessary order in Beckett’s own artistic project,
whose affirmation of the excess is possible only after the negation
of language: only the material constraints imposed on the artwork
allow it to achieve the immediacy and directness of that which
is perhaps best described as experience; only after the artwork
has been stripped of character, setting and meaning can language
regain its own material half-life.
Benjamin’s prophecy of incommunicability is fulfilled in
Beckett’s art, as the storyteller is disembodied, emptied out and
reduced to a ghostly remainder. The focus is turned back on the
text itself, which henceforth becomes an unstable process rather
than a given entity: the story is not told once by an identifiable
subject, it tells itself again and again; words gain a half-life of their
own through Derridean ‘différance’. Benjamin’s use of the present
continuous in his hint that there may be a ‘new beauty in what is
vanishing’ captures the nature of beauty in Beckett’s prose, which
lies precisely in the Badiouian ‘vanishing term’, the excess over
communicable reality that is always-already disappearing.
The ending of ‘Imagination’ is thus deceptive:
Mais non, la vie s’achève et non, il n’y a rien ailleurs, et plus
question de retrouver ce point blanc perdu dans la blancheur,
voir s’ils sont restés tranquilles au fort de cet orage, ou d’un
orage pire, ou dans le noir fermé pour de bon, ou la grande
blancheur immuable, et sinon ce qu’ils font. (57)
This seemingly nihilistic statement is in fact an affirmation of the
minimal difference. While the possibility of locating the minimal
difference of the ‘point blanc’ is negated by the speaking voice,
it is simultaneously affirmed by the syntax. The structure of
the prolix sentence, and the repetition of the conjunction ‘ou’,
manifest an unfolding of the existential void – the storm, darkness
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and whiteness – in endless permutations. The very possibility of
a ‘worse storm’, the possibility of difference, contradicts the
assertions of closure (‘noir fermé’) and immutability (‘blancheur
immuable’). With seismic force, the minimal excess produces tiny
cracks, which in turn induce eternal openings and shifts.
The minimal artwork can therefore never be a perfect whole,
a complete miniature, or a distilled essence. Nor is it simply
the art of the negative, a nihilistic statement, a pure vindication
of nothingness. The minimalist stance is an affirmative one. By
capitalising on the residual, the decaying, the vanishing, the
minimal artwork affirms the almost nothing, the barely present, the
something that resists annihilation. The processes of abstraction,
repetition and homogenisation that permeate Beckett’s art, like
that of his minimalist contemporaries, invariably unleash equal,
opposite forces of subtraction, difference and heterogeneity.
Beckett’s Têtes-mortes thus counteract the derogatory origins of
the term ‘minimalism’. The immediacy of the minimalist artwork,
its focus on the phenomenological ‘here and now’, allows lightning
to strike through the thunderstorm, creating flashes of insight into
another dimension, the space of the void. Benjamin’s ‘new beauty
in what is vanishing’ thus gains an additional meaning: beauty is
that which vanishes; it is the only truth we can be sure of; that of
the residue, of the present moment.
N O T E S
1. All subsequent references to Têtes-mortes are from this edition.
2. All subsequent references to ‘Sans’ are from this edition.
3. James Knowlson’s brilliant biography contains various interviews
in which the actors and directors with whom Beckett collaborated recall
the musical nature of Beckett’s view of his own work. According to
Duncan Scott, ‘there is no doubt that he treated words musically when
composing his sentences’; Alan Mandell, likewise, was ‘fascinated by
Beckett’s description of action in musical terms’ (Knowlson, 2006, 215,
200).
4. The most significant contributions in this area are found in the
following critical works: Leslie Hill, Beckett’s Fiction: In Different Words
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(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Ulrika Maude, Beckett,
Technology and the Body (Cambridge University Press, 2009); Andrea Oppo,
Philosophical Aesthetics and Samuel Beckett (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2008);
Richard Begam, ‘Beckett’s Kinetic Aesthetics’ (Journal of Beckett Studies, 16,
2006–7, 46–63).
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